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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DWAYNE MARVIN CARLSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 960135-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is from a final judgment and conviction for 
Receiving and Transferring Stolen Property, a 2nd° felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316(2) (1993) (a copy of the 
judgment is attached hereto as Addendum A), entered in the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Pat B. Brian, presiding. Defendant/Appellant 
Dwayne Marvin Carlson ("Carlson") also pled guilty to additional 
misdemeanor offenses, including giving false information to a 
peace officer and driving on a suspended license, which the state 
dismissed on its own motion. Jurisdiction is conferred on this 
Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented for review are as follows: 
1. Whether the trial court erred in submitting an 
instruction to the jury which created a rebuttable presumption 
that Carlson's mere possession of reportedly stolen property was 
proof that he stole the property and knew that it was stolen. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "Determining the propriety of a jury 
1 
instruction presents a question of law" which is reviewed non-
deferentially for correctness. State v. Brooks, 833 P.2d 362, 
363 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); see also State v. Smoot. No, 950550 
(Utah Ct. App. June 20, 1996). 
2. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the 
prosecutor during closing argument to make prejudicial remarks, 
which called the attention of the jurors to an obligation to 
convict Carlson on some basis other than the evidence. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court's ruling on whether the 
prosecutor's conduct merits a mistrial will be overturned for 
abuse of discretion. State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992); see also State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1118 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
Carlson's objection to the state's proposed jury instruction 
is preserved in the Record on Appeal ("R.") at 267-69, and his 
objection to the prosecutor's inflammatory and improper 
statements during closing argument is preserved at R. 293-95. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statutes and constitutional provisions will be 
determinative of the issues on appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la- 1316 (1993), Receiving or 
transferring stolen motor vehicle, trailer, or 
semitrailer -- Penalty. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-503 (1995), Presumption of fact. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-4 02 (1995), Presumptions and 
defenses. 
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Article I, Section 7, Utah Constitution. 
Amendment V, United States Constitution. 
Amendment XIV, United States Constitution. 
The text of those provisions is contained in the attached 
Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and 
Disposition in the Court Below. 
On July 22, 1995, Officer John Sheets ("Sheets") observed 
Carlson in a brown Mazda pickup truck that was missing a front 
license plate. (R. 176.) Sheets followed Carlson to a side 
street and detained him. (R. 176-78.) During detention, Carlson 
provided Sheets with false identification and blurted, "This 
vehicle isn't stolen," prompting Sheets to call for officer 
assistance. (R. 179-80.) 
After a second officer, Greg Carlson, arrived, the officers 
ran a check on the rear license plate number and the vehicle 
identification number. (R. 180-82.) The check reflected the 
Mazda pickup truck as reported stolen. (R. 182.) 
The officers arrested Carlson. (R. 182-83.) He was charged 
by Information with Count I: Receiving or Transferring a Stolen 
Motor Vehicle, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316(2) 
(1953 as amended); Count II: Giving False Information to a Peace 
Officer, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-506(1) (1953 as 
amended); Count III: License Plate and Registration Card Viola-
tion, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1305(1) (1953 as 
3 
amended); and Count IV: Driving on a Suspended License, in viola-
tion of Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-227 (1953 as amended), (R. 7-10.) 
After a jury trial, wherein Carlson admitted to giving false 
information to a peace officer and stipulated that on July 22, 
1995, he was driving on a suspended license, the state on its own 
motion dismissed Counts II, III, and IV. (R. 92, 121-23, 199.) 
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on Count I. (R. 120.) On 
February 9, 1996, the trial court entered judgment, sentencing 
Carlson to a term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen 
years in the Utah State Prison. (R. 145-46.) The trial court 
stayed the prison sentence and placed Carlson on probation in the 
custody of the Utah Department of Corrections, where he currently 
is serving 12 months in a Department of Corrections program. 
(Id.) Carlson is appealing from the entry of the February 9, 
1996 judgment. (R. 147-48.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During the late evening of July 14, 1995, Carlson was 
visiting friends at the Crystal Inn Hotel when he saw an 
acquaintance, Laura, pushing a brown 1981 Mazda pickup truck with 
a dented front end. (R. 207-08.) Carlson knew Laura to be the 
girlfriend of another acquaintance, Steve Johnson. (R. 208, 210.) 
When Carlson offered to help, Laura accepted and represented to 
him that she and Steve Johnson jointly owned the Mazda truck. 
(R. 210, 236.) Carlson was unable to get the Mazda truck 
started. (R. 209.) He and Laura left it in a restaurant parking 
lot and went to Doug Haycock's house where Carlson slept while 
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Haycock and Laura ran errands in Carlson's Nissan station wagon. 
(R. 210.) 
The next morning, July 15, Carlson discovered Laura had not 
returned with his station wagon. (R. 211.) He found Steve 
Johnson and asked him about Laura. Steve Johnson told Carlson 
that he did not know where Laura could be found and that the 
Mazda truck belonged to her. (R. 212.) Carlson's mother 
testified that thereafter she reported to the police that 
Carlson's station wagon was missing. (R. 223, 249.) 
Carlson's friend, Troy Murdock ("Murdock"), testified that 
on July 18, 1995, he and Carlson returned to the restaurant 
parking lot where the Mazda truck had been abandoned four days 
earlier and Carlson repaired it. (R. 214-17, 255-56.) There-
after, Carlson set out to find Laura in order to return the Mazda 
truck to her and to recover his station wagon. (R. 216, 253.) 
On July 22, 1995, Sheets observed Carlson driving the Mazda 
truck on Main Street in Salt Lake City without a front license 
plate. (R. 175-76.) Sheets made a turn to follow the Mazda and 
the driver "accelerated a little bit, and cut through traffic, 
and turned down" a side street. (R. 176.) After Sheets located 
the truck, he approached Carlson and requested identification. 
(R. 177-78.) Carlson admitted to the jury that in response to 
Sheets' request, he twice provided a false name, a false social 
security number, and an incorrect birth date, and he lied about 
having a valid driver's license. (R. 218-19, 224-26, 239.) He 
also admitted to the jury that he misled officers because he was 
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afraid he would go to jail and was nervous for "driving on a 
suspension," and he knew there was an outstanding warrant for his 
arrest. (R. 226-230.) 
In response to questions concerning the Mazda pickup truck, 
Carlson did not disclose to Sheets that Laura was the owner 
because he did not know her last name. (R. 221.) Rather, he 
told Sheets the Mazda belonged to Steve Johnson. (R. 221, 234-
35, 183-84.) According to Sheets, before he asked Carlson about 
the Mazda truck, Carlson blurted, "This vehicle isn't stolen," 
prompting Sheets to call for officer assistance. (R. 179-80, 
230-31.) 
After a second officer, Greg Carlson, arrived to assist 
Sheets, they ran a check through dispatch on the rear license 
plate number of the Mazda truck and on the vehicle identification 
number. (R. 180-82, 195.) The check reflected the license plate 
belonged to a Buick and the Mazda truck was reported stolen that 
morning by a used car dealer, Steve Clark. (R. 164, 169, 181-82, 
195-96.) Meanwhile, Sheets discovered through dispatch that 
Carlson had given him misleading information concerning his 
identification. Thus, he arrested Carlson and provided him with 
his rights per Miranda. (R. 180, 182.) 
After Carlson was in police custody, officers released the 
Mazda truck to the used car dealer, Steve Clark ("Clark"). (R. 
165, 196.) Clark testified that a "by-pass" or "after-market" 
ignition had been placed on the steering column of the Mazda, and 
that such ignitions allow vehicle operators to bypass the initial 
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ignition in order to start the vehicle engine. (R. 167-68, 172.) 
Clark also testified that such bypass ignitions may be used if 
the original ignition is not working properly. (R. 172.) 
Sheets, Carlson, and corroborating defense witnesses testified 
that they did not observe a "by-pass" or "after-market" ignition 
on the steering column of the Mazda when Carlson was in 
possession of the vehicle. (R. 185-86 (Sheets' testimony), 237-
38, 242 (Carlson's testimony), 254 (Josh Maestas' testimony).) 
In addition, Clark and Sheets testified that the Mazda suffered 
no damage while in Carlson's possession and there were no signs 
of forced entry to suggest that it had been stolen or that anyone 
had broken into it. (R. 171, 187.) 
On July 28, 1995, Carlson was charged by Information with 
Count I: Receiving or Transferring a Stolen Motor Vehicle, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316(2) (1953 as amended); 
Count II: Giving False Information to a Peace Officer, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-506(1) (1953 as amended); 
Count III: License Plate and Registration Card Violation, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1305(1) (1953 as amended); 
and Count IV: Driving on a Suspended License, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-227 (1953 as amended). (R. 7-10.)1 
During the jury trial on Count I, Receiving or Transferring 
a Stolen Motor Vehicle, the state proposed an instruction, which 
1
 In addition to admitting to the jury that he had provided Sheets 
with false information concerning his identification (R. 218-19, 224-26, 
239), Carlson stipulated during trial that on July 22, 1995, he was 
driving on a suspended license. (R. 199.) 
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the trial court provided to the jury over Carlson's objection: 
Possession of property recently stolen, if not 
satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance 
from which you may reasonably draw the inference and 
find, in light of the surrounding circumstances shown 
by the evidence in the case, that the person in 
possession of the stolen property stole the property 
and knew that the property was stolen. 
Thus, if you find from the evidence and beyond a 
reasonable doubt (1) that the defendant was in 
possession of property, (2) that the property was 
stolen, (3) that such possession was not too remote in 
point of time from the theft, and (4) that no 
satisfactory explanation of such possession has been 
given or appears from the evidence, then you may infer 
from those facts and find that the defendant stole the 
property and knew the property was stolen. 
(R. 110, 096, 267-69.) During closing argument, the prosecutor 
placed special emphasis on that instruction: 
It seems to me probably the most important 
instruction you were given, and I don't remember the 
numbers, but it's the one that starts off with, 
"Possession of property recently stolen, if not 
satisfactorily explained is ordinarily a circumstance 
from which you may reasonable [sic] draw the inference 
and find in light of the surrounding circumstances by 
the evidence that the person in possession of the 
stolen property knew or had reason to believe it was 
stolen," and then it goes on to the next paragraph to 
say, "If you find from the evidence that the defendant, 
one, was in possession of the property, two, the 
property was stolen, three, that the possession was not 
too remote in point of time from the theft, and four, 
that no satisfactory explanation of such possession had 
been given, you may infer from those facts and find 
that the defendant knew the property was stolen." 
You will note that those are the requirements. I 
don't think there's any question he was in possession 
of the property. There's no question it was stolen. 
There's no question that it was not too remote in time. 
I mean, he's in possession on the 22nd. The vehicle 
was stolen according to the owner, Mr. Clark, at least 
two days earlier. According to the defendant, he had 
it for four days. I don't think there's any question 
about possession of recently stolen property. 
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The only real issue here is whether or not you buy 
his explanation as to how he gained possession of this 
property. That's really what this case is all about. 
(R. 271-72 (A complete set of the instructions provided to the 
jury is attached hereto as Addendum C).) 
In addition, during closing argument, the prosecutor stated 
the following: 
Well, members of the jury, I submit to you that if 
after this case is all over you walk out to the parking 
lot and you discovered that somebody has stolen your 
vehicle, and two or three days go by and all of a 
sudden as you're driving down the road, you see your 
vehicle and you see Mr. Carlson driving that vehicle, 
and you pull him over and stop him and you say to him, 
"What are you doing in my vehicle?" --
* * * 
And you say to him, "What are you doing in my 
vehicle?" And he says to you, "Steve Johnson gave me 
this vehicle," I submit to you there isn't one of you 
that would let him go, that would simply let him walk 
away. What you would do is call the police or you'd 
hang on to him yourself and yet, that's exactly what 
the defense is asking you to do in this case, to let 
him go because he comes in to this courtroom and tells 
you that the story he gave Officer Sheets when he 
pulled him over was that somebody just gave him this 
vehicle. Well, members of the jury, I submit that you 
wouldn't buy it if you were in that situation, and I 
submit also that you shouldn't buy it in this case. I'm 
not saying the defendant stole the vehicle, but what we 
are saying was that he was in possession of a stolen 
motor vehicle and he knew or had reason to believe it 
was stolen. 
(R. 293-94.) The jury returned a guilty verdict on Count I; the 
state dismissed Counts II, III, and IV. (R. 120-22.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court submitted to the jury an instruction that 
created a presumption of guilt, which violates Utah statutory 
law, case law, and constitutional law as follows: 
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The presumption instruction violates Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-
503 for two reasons. First, that portion of the instruction 
that directed the jury to presume Carlson "stole the proper-
ty" based on his possession of the vehicle was not supported 
by the evidence or the Information, since Carlson was never 
charged in this matter with theft, larceny or stealing the 
property. Second, that portion of the instruction that 
directed the jury to presume Carlson "knew the property was 
stolen" is not supported by a presumption "established by 
[Utah] code or other penal statute." U.C.A. § 76-1-503. 
That portion of the instruction that directed the jury to 
presume Carlson "stole the property," was loosely patterned 
after Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1). The Utah Supreme Court 
has repeatedly ruled that the statutory presumption is 
"addressed only to the court," and is relevant to the trial 
court in considering whether the evidence is sufficient to 
constitute a prima facie case. State v. Crowder, 197 P.2d 
917, 921 (Utah 1948). For the trial court to instruct the 
jury with respect to the presumption is erroneous. Id. 
The presumption instruction violates the due process 
provisions of the Utah and federal constitutions. The 
instruction together with the entire jury charge possibly 
were interpreted by the jury to relieve the state of its 
burden of proof on the element of mental culpability, giving 
the instruction a "conclusive" effect. Alternatively, the 
jury may have given the instruction the permissive 
interpretation, which has the effect of shifting the burden 
of proof to Carlson to prove he lacked the requisite mental 
culpability. Both interpretations are unconstitutional. In 
addition, the instruction was irrational. It asked the jury 
to find that Carlson had reason to believe the vehicle was 
stolen, based on his possession of the vehicle. Because the 
instruction and jury charge create a tenuous inference, the 
instruction is unconstitutional. 
The trial court also erred in permitting the prosecutor to 
make remarks during closing argument that effectively encouraged 
the jurors to put themselves in the position of the victim. The 
remarks constitute prosecutorial misconduct. The improper re-
marks and presumption instruction compromised the verdict and the 
substantial likelihood of a more favorable result for Carlson. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE INSTRUCTION PROVIDED TO THE JURY WAS 
IMPROPER AND CREATED AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION. 
During trial, the jury in this matter was charged with 
determining whether Carlson was innocent or guilty of Count I, 
Receiving or Transferring a Stolen Motor Vehicle, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316(2) (1993). That provision states: 
It is a second degree felony for a person: 
• * * 
(2) to have in his possession any motor vehicle, 
trailer, or semitrailer that he knows or has reason to 
believe has been stolen or unlawfully taken if he is 
not a peace officer engaged at the time in the 
performance of his duty. 
The trial court submitted to the jury an instruction concerning 
the elements of the charged offense. It stated that to convict 
Carlson of the offense, the jury must find, 
1. That on or about the 22nd of July, 1995, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, Dwayne 
Carlson, had in his possession a motor vehicle; and 
2. That the defendant knew that said property had 
been stolen or had reason to believe that said property 
had been stolen; and 
3. That the defendant had in his possession said 
property with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof. 
(R. 112.) 
As set forth in the Statement of Facts, the trial court also 
submitted an instruction that directed the jury to find that 
Carlson had the requisite mental state to steal the Mazda truck 
and to know it was stolen based on his possession of the Mazda 
truck. The instruction directed the jury to render a guilty 
verdict if it found, (1) Carlson was in possession of the Mazda 
11 
truck, (2) the Mazda truck was stolen, (3) Carlson's possession 
was not too remote in point of time from the theft, and (4) no 
satisfactory explanation of such possession was given or appeared 
from the evidence (R. 110, 267-69) (hereinafter the 
"Instruction"). The trial court submitted that Instruction to 
the jury in violation of Utah statutory and case law and state 
and federal constitutional provisions. 
A. The Instruction Improperly Expanded a Utah 
Statutory Presumption. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-503 (1995), the issue of 
an evidentiary presumption may be submitted to the jury if it is 
"established by this code or other penal statute," the state has 
presented "evidence of facts which support the presumption," and 
the trial court deems the presumption appropriate. Only part of 
the presumption submitted to the jury in this matter was pat-
terned after a statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402 (1),2 while the 
remainder of the Instruction clearly was not established by "code 
or other penal statute." 
Section 76-6-402(1) provides the following: 
Possession of property recently stolen, when no 
satisfactory explanation of such possession is made, 
shall be deemed prima facie evidence that the person in 
possession stole the property. 
2
 The text of the Instruction deviates in part from the language 
of the statute as follows: where the statute states, ". . . such 
possession . . . shall be deemed prima facie evidence that the person 
in possession stole the property", the Instruction states: "Possession 
. . . is ordinarily a circumstance from which vou may reasonably draw the 
inference and find, in light of the surrounding circumstances shown by 
the evidence in the case, that the person in possession of the stolen 
property stole the property and knew that the property was stolen." 
(Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1) to R. 110, 267-69.) 
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That statute is relevant in cases where the defendant is charged 
with burglary, robbery or larceny. See State v.Johnson, 745 P.2d 
452 (Utah 1987) (aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, and 
theft); State v. Clayton, 658 P.2d 621 (Utah 1983) (auto theft 
prosecution); State v. Sessions, 583 P.2d 44 (Utah 1978); State 
v. Heath, 492 P.2d 978, 979 (Utah 1972); State v. Donovan, 294 P. 
1108 (Utah 1931) (robbery case). Although the Instruction in 
this case directed the jury to find that Carlson's possession of 
the stolen vehicle supported the inference that he "stole the 
property" (R. 110, 267-69), the state failed to present evidence 
to support that presumption. In fact, the state failed to charge 
Carlson with such an offense in this case. (R. 7-10; 293-94 (the 
prosecutor unequivocally affirmed that Carlson was not accused of 
stealing the vehicle).) Thus, under Section 76-1-503, it was 
improper for the trial court to submit to the jury that portion 
of the presumption Instruction that was established by Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-402(1) (1995). 
With regard to the remainder of the Instruction (see the 
emphasized portion of the Instruction set forth in note 2, 
supra), the jury was instructed to infer that Carlson had the 
requisite mental state to commit the offense of receiving stolen 
property based on his possession of the stolen vehicle. That 
presumption is not "established by [the Utah] code or other penal 
statute." Thus, under § 76-1-503, the trial court erred in pro-
viding that portion of the presumption Instruction to the jury. 
B. The Presumption Established by Section 76-6-402(1) 
Is Directed to the Trial Court, Not the Jury. 
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In the event this Court determines the portion of the 
Instruction going to the charge of receiving stolen property was 
established by "code or other penal statute,"3 the trial court 
erred in submitting it to the jury for the following reason: The 
statutory presumption identified at § 76-6-402(1) is not an issue 
for the jury. 
The Utah Supreme Court repeatedly has ruled that the 
statutory presumption identified in Section 76-6-402(1) "merely 
provides a standard by which to determine whether the evidence 
presented warrants submission to the jury." State v. Chambers, 
709 P.2d 321, 327 (Utah 1985). "If a defendant makes no 
satisfactory explanation of his possession of stolen property, 
the trial judge can conclude that the State has established a 
prima facie case against the defendant and submit the case to the 
jury." State v. Pacheco, 712 P.2d 192, 194 (Utah 1986); State 
v. Graves, 717 P.2d 717 (Utah 1986) (in determining the 
sufficiency of the evidence, court considers whether the 
statutory presumption has been met); Crowder, 197 P.2d at 921 
(the statutory presumption is "addressed only to the court, it 
determines for the court what evidence is sufficient to 
constitute a prima facie case, and it is the duty of the court 
when a prima facie case has been made to submit it to the jury, 
3
 The trial court's submission of the portion of the Instruction 
directing the jury to find that Carlson "stole the property" clearly was 
erroneous since Carlson was never charged with or tried for stealing- the 
property. Thus, the issue of whether the trial court erred in submitting 
that portion of the Instruction to the jury is obvious and merits no 
further discussion. 
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but it does not require the court to instruct the jury that such 
facts constitute a prima facie case"); State v. Barretta, 155 P. 
343, 346-47 (Utah 1916) (presumption presents a question of 
efficiency of the evidence, which is a question of law; the court 
cannot leave that question to a jury). Thus, the statutory pre-
sumption is a tool for the trial court to determine whether the 
evidence is sufficient to go to the jury or to support a verdict. 
In this case, the trial court's characterization of the 
presumption as a factual "inference" (see note 2, supra) does not 
alter the purpose of the presumption as stated in Chambers, 
Pacheco, Graves, Crowder, and Barretta. See State v. Sorenson, 
758 P.2d 466, 468 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (this Court disregards the 
trial court's characterization of a legal presumption as a 
"factual assumption"). The trial court is the exclusive finder 
of fact with regard to the evidentiary presumption, just as it is 
with other preliminary evidentiary and jurisdictional issues. 
Trial courts hear evidence and make determinations concerning (1) 
the suppression of evidence in criminal proceedings; (2) "the 
qualifications of a person to be a witness, the existence of a 
privilege, or the admissibility of evidence", Utah R. Evid. 104; 
(3) the voluntariness and admissibility of a confession, State v. 
Hinton, 680 P.2d 749, 751 (Utah 1984) (citing Lego v. Twomey, 404 
U.S. 477 (1972) (the Sixth Amendment right to a jury does not 
change the normal rule that the admissibility of evidence is a 
question for the court rather than the jury)), overruled on other 
grounds, State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 463 n.71 (Utah 1988); and 
(4) jurisdiction and venue, Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(3) (1995). 
15 
While a party may introduce at trial evidence relating to the 
geographical location of a crime, the evidence does not 
constitute a relinquishment to the jury of the trial court's 
obligation to determine jurisdiction. Simple semantics cannot 
transform the trial court's responsibility to determine whether 
the state has presented a prima facie case into a question of 
fact for the jury. 
Thus, the submission of an instruction emphasizing facts 
relevant to the evidentiary presumption, whether such facts are 
characterized as "prima facie evidence" or factual inferences, 
"could only be confusing and might lead the jury to conclude the 
State had met its burden of proving ultimate guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt by making out a prima facie case." Chambers, 
709 P.2d at 327 (quoting State v. Hall, 145 P.2d 494, 500 (Utah 
1944)); Crowder, 197 P.2d at 921. Submitting the issue of such a 
presumption to a jury may cause the jury to single out and 
emphasize less compelling particular evidence in a case to 
determine guilt, to the exclusion of relevant evidence bearing on 
the defendant's lack of mental culpability. See Francis v. 
Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1985). 
The Utah Supreme Court repeatedly has ruled in recent 
decisions that an instruction patterned after the presumption set 
forth in Section 76-6-402(1) is unconstitutional and improper. 
See State v. Smith, 726 P.2d 1232, 1235-36 (Utah 1986) ("Lest 
there be a misunderstanding of our ruling in this case, we 
emphatically declare that we do not retreat from Chambers. The 
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trial court should not have used the statutory language [of 
Section 76-6-402(1)] in the instruction for the reasons stated in 
Chambers");4 State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368, 1372 (Utah 1986) 
("[B]ecause a reasonable juror could have understood the 
challenged jury instruction to create a mandatory presumption 
that shifted to the defendant the burden of persuasion on the 
crucial element of intent and because the explanatory instruction 
does not cure the error, the jury charge in this case does not 
comport with the requirements of due process"); State v. Clayton, 
658 P.2d 621, 624 (Utah 1983) (instruction "may have been in 
error"); State v. Crowder, 197 P.2d 917, 921 (Utah 1948) 
(instructing the jury with respect to the presumption was 
erroneous); State v Turner, 736 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1987) (the 
language of the presumption instruction is unconstitutional); but 
see State v. Asay, 631 P.2d 861 (Utah 1981). Consistent with the 
principle that the trial court is the exclusive finder of fact 
concerning evidentiary matters, and Utah law concerning the 
impropriety of submitting an instruction to the jury patterned 
after Section 76-6-402, the trial court's submission of the 
Instruction to the jury in this matter was improper. 
C. The Instruction Unconstitutionally Shifted the 
Burden of Proof to Carlson. 
It is beyond controversy that under the criminal law, the 
4
 In State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah 1987), the court 
appears to have retreated from Chambers and without discussion simply 
cites to Smith in support of the proposition that an instruction 
patterned after the statutory presumption "was not defective." Id. That 
decision is puzzling given the clear line of cases from the court on that 
very issue. 
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burden is upon the prosection to prove all elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
[I]t is . . . to be kept in mind that the burden of 
proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 
is always upon the state: both initially and 
ultimately. Therefore, the only requirement on the 
defense . . . is that it be sufficient to raise the 
reasonable doubt. 
State v. Robichaux, 639 P.2d 207 (Utah 1981) (quoting. State v. 
Curtis, 542 P.2d 744 (Utah 1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 
(1970)). 
The Court in Winship recognized the "reasonable doubt" 
standard to be based on rights "'developed to safeguard men from 
dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting forfeitures of 
life, liberty and property.'" Winship, 397 U.S. at 362-64 
(quoting Davis v. U.S., 160 U.S. 469, 506 (1895)); see also State 
v. Sorenson. 758 P.2d 466, 468-69 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (Due 
Process requires prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged); Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-501 (1995); Utah Const, art. I, § 7; U.S. Const, 
amend. V, XIV.5 As such, it "prohibits the State from using 
evidentiary presumptions in a jury charge that have the effect of 
relieving the State of its burden of persuasion beyond a 
5
 The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, 
in pertinent part, the following: 
No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be 
a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law . . . . 
Its mandates are made applicable to states via the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution. Article I, sec. 7 of the Utah 
Constitution likewise provides: "No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of law." In this matter, the 
Utah provision is given as much force as the federal counterpart. Carlson 
is not seeking a distinct analysis under Utah's Art. I, sec. 7. 
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reasonable doubt of every essential element of a crime." 
Francis, 471 U.S. at 313. 
Since presumptions and inferences "shift the burden of 
production or persuasion to the defendant by requiring him or her 
to present some evidence contesting the otherwise presumed or 
inferred fact, these devices must satisfy certain due process 
requirements." Sorenson, 758 P.2d at 468. 
"[I]n criminal cases, the ultimate test of any 
[evidentiary] device's constitutional validity in a 
given case remains constant: the device must not 
undermine the factfinder's responsibility at trial, 
based on evidence adduced by the State, to find the 
ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. 
Chambers, 709 P.2d 321, 325 (Utah 1985) (quoting County 
Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979). The use of any 
mandatory rebuttable presumption which "requires the 
jury to find the presumed element unless the defendant 
persuades the jury that such a finding is unwarranted" 
is one such evidentiary device found to be unconstitu-
tional. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314 n. 2 
(1985). See also Chambers, 709 P.2d at 326; State v. 
Turner, 736 P.2d 1043, 1045 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Sorenson, 758 P.2d at 468-69; Turner, 736 P.2d at 1045; Chambers, 
709 P.2d at 326. 
In determining whether a presumption instruction violates 
the state and federal due process provisions, the threshold 
question concerns the nature of the presumption, i.e. the 
interpretation which a jury could have given the instruction. 
Francis, 471 U.S. at 316; Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 514 
(1979). 
The presumption Instruction in this matter twice stated that 
possession of property recently stolen, if not satisfactorily 
explained, is a circumstance from which the jury may find that 
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Carlson had the requisite mental culpability to support a 
conviction for the offense of receiving stolen property. (R. 
110, 267-69.) The Instruction together with the entire jury 
charge (see Addendum C) failed to inform the jury that the 
presumption could be rebutted, or that Carlson was required only 
to present "some" evidence to rebut the presumption. In 
addition, the prosecutor stated: The "only real issue here is 
whether or not you buy his explanation as to how he gained 
possession of this property. That's really what this case is all 
about." (R. 271-72.) That statement placed the burden squarely 
on Carlson to prove his innocence. 
The ambiguity of the Instruction alone and in the context of 
the entire jury charge supports the determination that the jury 
could have given the Instruction a mandatory or a permissive 
interpretation, both of which violate the federal and state due 
process provisions. 
1. The "conclusive," mandatory interpretation is 
unconstitutional. 
Because the Instruction together with the jury charge failed 
to further explain the effect of the presumption, the Instruction 
effectively relieved the state of its burden of proof on a 
critical element of the offense -- mental culpability.6 The 
6
 In this matter, Carlson did not dispute that he was driving the 
Mazda truck on a suspended license at the time of the arrest. The only 
issues for the jury to consider were whether he knew the truck was stolen 
and whether he had the purpose of depriving the owner of the truck. 
Carlson controverted those elements by introducing evidence solely on 
those points. "Thus, the question before this Court is whether the 
challenged jury instruction had the effect of relieving the State of the 
(continued...) 
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jury could well have interpreted the presumption as "conclusive," 
that is, not technically as a presumption at all, but 
rather as an irrebuttable direction by the court to 
find intent once convinced of the facts triggering the 
presumption. 
State v. Robichaux, 639 P.2d 207, 209-10 (Utah 1981). Under the 
conclusive approach, the state would be required only to 
establish "possession." Thereafter, the presumption Instruction 
permitted the jury to find that Carlson (1) knew or had reason to 
believe the truck was stolen and/or (2) possessed the property 
with the purpose of depriving the owner of it. That finding 
could be made even if all other evidence together would not 
establish the requisite mental state. Thus, the Instruction 
would effectively eliminate mental culpability as an ingredient 
of the offense. 
The United States Supreme Court in United States v. United 
States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978), held that mental 
culpability is an element that cannot be taken from the trier of 
fact with the use of presumptions: 
[A] defendant's state of mind or intent is an element 
of a criminal antitrust offense which . . . cannot be 
taken from the trier of fact through reliance on a 
legal presumption of wrongful intent from proof of an 
effect on prices. Cf. Morissette v. United States . . . 
• * * 
Although an effect on prices may well support an 
inference that the defendant had knowledge of the 
probability of such a consequence at the time he acted, 
the jury must remain free to consider additional 
evidence before accepting or rejecting the inference. 
. . [U]ltimately the decision on the issue of intent 
6(...continued) 
burden of proof enunciated in Winship on the critical question of 
petitioner's state of mind." Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 520-21. 
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must be left to the trier of fact alone. The 
instruction given invaded this factfinding function. 
Id. at 435. 
As in United States Gypsum Co., the conclusive presumption 
in this case would "conflict with the overriding presumption of 
innocence with which the law endows the accused and which extends 
to every element of the crime," and would "invade [the] 
factfinding function" which in a criminal case the law assigns 
solely to the jury. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 510 (quoting 
Morissette v. U.S., 342 U.S. 246, 275 (1952); and United States 
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 446). The Instruction and jury charge 
presented to Carlson's jury may have had exactly these 
consequences. Upon finding proof of one element of the crime 
(possession), and of facts insufficient to establish his mental 
state to knowingly and purposely commit the offense, Carlson's 
jurors could reasonably have concluded that they were directed to 
find against him on the element of mental culpability. The state 
was thus not forced to prove "beyond a reasonable doubt . . . 
every fact necessary to constitute the crime . . . charged" and 
Carlson was deprived of his constitutional rights as explicated 
in Winship. See Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 523; Francis, 471 U.S. at 
3 07 (although instruction informed jury twice that instruction 
could be rebutted, the possibility that jury would interpret it 
to create a mandatory presumption rendered it unconstitutional). 
2. Under the "permissive" approach, the Instruction 
shifts the burden of persuasion. 
Alternatively, the jury could have interpreted the 
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Instruction as permissive and concluded that upon proof by the 
state of Carlson's possession of the vehicle, and of additional 
facts not themselves establishing the element of knowing and 
purposeful conduct, the burden was shifted to Carlson to prove 
that he lacked the requisite mental state. The language of the 
Instruction and the prosecutor's comments concerning the "only 
real issue here" (R. 271-72) lend strong support to such an 
interpretation. The jury charge failed to remedy such an 
interpretation. (See Addendum C.) 
The jury may have charged Carlson with the burden of proving 
a lack of mental culpability "by some quantum of proof which may 
well have been considerably greater than 'some' evidence -- thus 
effectively shifting the burden of persuasion on the element of 
intent." Robichaux, 639 P.2d at 209 (quoting Sandstrom, 442 U.S. 
at 517); Chambers, 709 P.2d at 325. The effect of such an 
interpretation was illustrated by the Court in Mullaney v. 
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). In that case, the defendant was 
charged in Maine with murder, which required proof not only of 
intent but of malice. The trial court instructed the jury that 
"malice aforethought is an essential and indispensable element of 
the crime of murder." Id. at 686. It also instructed that if 
the prosecution established that the homicide was both 
intentional and unlawful, malice aforethought was to be implied 
unless the defendant proved by a fair preponderance of the 
evidence that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden 
provocation. Id. The Court ruled that the defendant's due 
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process rights were invaded by the presumption since it cast upon 
him the burden of proving that he lacked the requisite mental 
culpability to be convicted of murder. 
In this matter, the state was required to prove possession, 
knowing conduct and purpose. (R. 112.) The trial court 
instructed the jury that it could convict Carlson of the charged 
offense if the prosecution established possession, since mental 
culpability could be presumed unless the jury bought Carlson's 
"explanation as to how he gained possession of [the] property." 
(R. 271-72.) Because Carlson's jury may have interpreted the 
trial court's instructions as constituting a burden-shifting 
presumption, thereby depriving him of his right to the due 
process of law, the Instruction alone and in the context of the 
jury charge was unconstitutional. 
3. Even if the Instruction is not unconstitutional 
under the conclusive or permissive approach, it is 
illogical and unreasonable. 
The inference violates the state and federal due process 
provisions if the suggested conclusion "is not one that reason 
and common sense justify in light of the proven facts before the 
jury." Francis, 4 71 U.S. at 314. The Supreme Court's rulings in 
United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965), and United States 
v. Gainev, 380 U.S. 63 (1965), are illustrative of that point. 
In Gainev, the Supreme Court upheld an instruction, which tracked 
the language of a provision of the United States Code and 
authorized the jury to infer from the defendant's unexplained 
presence at an illegal still that he was carrying on "the 
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business of a distiller or rectifier without having given bond as 
required by law." The Court reasoned that persons present at a 
still, which was usually secreted in an isolated area, were most 
likely connected with the business of carrying on the illegal 
enterprise. Gainey, 380 U.S. at 69-70. 
After Gainev, the Court in Romano determined that "presence 
at an illegal still" could not support an inference going to a 
narrower offense that the defendant was in possession, custody, 
or control of the still. "Presence is relevant and admissible 
evidence in a trial on a possession charge; but absent some 
showing of the defendant's function at the still, its connection 
with possession is too tenuous to permit a reasonable inference 
of guilty -- 'the inference of the one from proof of the other is 
arbitrary. . . '" Romano, 382 U.S. at 141 (quoting Tot v. United 
States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943)); see also Barnes v. United 
States, 412 U.S. 837, 841-42 (1973). 
In Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969), the Court 
stated that an inference is "'irrational' or 'arbitrary,' and 
hence unconstitutional, unless it can at least be said with 
substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than 
not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend." 
Id. at 36. Presumptions and inferences do no more than "accord 
to the evidence, if unexplained, its natural probative force." 
Id. at 3 5 (cites omitted). The Court in Leary held that mere 
possession of marihuana did not support an inference that 
defendant had the knowledge concerning a characteristic 
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particular to that marihuana -- that it was illegally imported 
into the United States. The possibility that any given marihuana 
was domestically grown made the inference too tenuous. 
Consistent with Gainev, Romano and Leary, the mere 
possession of recently stolen property is not rationally 
connected to an inference that a suspect had knowledge concerning 
a characteristic particular to that property -- that it was 
stolen. The offense of knowingly possessing stolen property is 
narrower than and is at least one step removed from the offense 
of stealing the property. Unless the suspect is charged with 
accomplishing the theft, the possession presumption is irrational 
and arbitrary. See People v. Harris, 68 N.E.2d 728 (111. 1946) 
(recent-unexplained possession principle is applicable to 
larceny, not to receiving stolen property); Payne v. State, 43 5 
P.2d 424 (Okla. 1968). 
D. Carlson Was Prejudiced by the Instruction. 
The Utah Supreme Court has admonished trial courts that the 
language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1) "should not be used in 
any form to instruct juries in theft and burglary cases." Turner, 
736 P.2d at 1045 (emphasis added). Its effects are too 
prejudicial. 
In this case, Carlson did not confess to knowing or having 
reason to know the truck he was driving on July 22, 1995, was 
stolen, or that he was in possession of the truck for the purpose 
of depriving the owner of it. Rather, he confessed to other 
misdemeanor offenses -- providing officers with false information 
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concerning his identification and driving on a suspended license 
-- and he acknowledged that he was in possession of the Mazda 
truck on July 22, 1995. (R. 199, 218-19, 224-26, 239.) 
Carlson's defense was that he did not have the requisite 
mental state to be convicted of the offense of receiving stolen 
property. The facts did not preclude that defense. During the 
trial, he presented witnesses to support his defense that he did 
not have a belief that the Mazda truck was stolen. His mother 
and friends testified to the events preceding his arrest -- his 
car was taken by "Laura," he worked on the Mazda truck to get it 
running, and he began searching for Laura in order to get his car 
back. (See R. 249, 253, 255-57.) 
Because Carlson's culpable mental state was plainly at issue 
in this case, and was not overwhelmingly proved by the evidence, 
the presentation to the jury of the presumption Instruction 
together with the additional instructions was not harmless. The 
possibility exists that the jury could have believed that proof 
of Carlson's presence in the truck was sufficient to convict him 
of knowing the Mazda was stolen. The possibility also exists 
that the jury believed Carlson should have been charged with 
stealing the property. The improper Instruction and jury charge 
serve to accommodate such prejudicial beliefs. 
Because the Instruction was presented to the jury in 
violation of Utah statutory and case law and in violation of the 
due process provisions of the state and federal constitutions, 
and because the jury instructions in their entirety failed to 
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cure the infirmity, the instructions in the aggregate prejudiced 
Carlson. The judgment must be vacated. 
POINT II. THE PROSECUTOR'S REMARKS DURING CLOSING 
ARGUMENT CALLED THE ATTENTION OF THE JURORS TO MATTERS 
THEY WERE NOT JUSTIFIED IN CONSIDERING. 
In addition to presenting the jury with an unconstitutional, 
improper Instruction (see Point I, supra), the trial court 
permitted the prosecutor to make remarks during closing argument 
that called the attention of the jurors to circumstances they 
were not justified in considering in connection with a verdict. 
The prosecutor specifically asked the jurors to consider the 
following: "If after this case is all over you walk out to the 
parking lot and you discovered that somebody has stolen your 
vehicle, and two or three days go by and all of a sudden as 
you're driving down the road, you see your vehicle and you see 
Mr. Carlson driving that vehicle. . . and you pull him over . . . 
I submit to you there isn't one of you that would let him go." 
(R. 293-94.) The prosecutor implored the jurors on that basis to 
resist "letting [Carlson] go" on the charged offense. (Id.) 
Those remarks were not based on the evidence, but were used 
to evoke emotion. "Statements which suggest that the jury has an 
obligation to convict a defendant on some basis other than solely 
on the evidence before it are improper and beyond the broad 
latitude allowed in closing argument." State v. Andreason, 718 
P.2d 400, 402 (Utah 1986). 
It is improper for a prosecutor to "divert the jury from its 
duty to decide the case on the evidence." ABA Standards for 
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Criminal Justice Prosecution Function and Defense Function § 3-
5.8(d) (3d ed. 1993) . 
The [prosecutor] is the representative not of an 
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty 
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling 
as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, 
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it 
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As 
such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the 
servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that 
guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may 
prosecute with earnestness and vigor -- indeed, he 
should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he 
is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much 
his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to 
produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every 
legitimate means to bring about a just one. 
Bercrer v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935); see also. United 
States v. Teslim, 896 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting 
impropriety of "golden rule" argument, whereby prosecutor 
encourages jurors to put themselves in the position of the 
victim). 
The remarks were not only improper, but they also were 
prejudicial. Where the proof of a defendant's guilt is strong, 
Utah courts "will not presume the improper remark to be 
prejudicial. But in a case with less than compelling proof, we 
will more closely scrutinize the prosecutor's conduct." 
Andreason, 718 P.2d at 402-03. Where evidence of mental 
culpability on the part of the defendant is based entirely on 
circumstantial evidence and "presumptions", as in this matter, 
jurors are more likely influenced by an improper 
argument. In such instances, they are more susceptible 
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to the suggestion that factors other than the evidence 
before them should determine a defendant's guilt or 
innocence. . . . In view of the highly marginal nature 
of any evidence of criminal intent or knowledge on the 
part of defendant, a reasonable likelihood exists that 
in the absence of the prosecutor's prejudicial 
argument, there might have been a different result. 
Id. 
Criminal intent or knowledge in this case was presented in 
the form of an improper Instruction concerning factual 
inferences. (See Point I, supra.) There was no direct evidence 
that Carlson was aware that the Mazda truck was stolen 
particularly since it had a damaged front end (R. 207-08), was in 
need of repairs (R. 209), and, according to the state's 
witnesses, bore no sign of forced entry or that anyone had broken 
into it. (R. 171, 187.) Although Carlson stated to Sheets that 
the "vehicle isn't stolen" (R. 179-80), such a statement tracks 
the fact that Carlson was driving a truck that did not belong to 
him and that he believed belonged to Laura. While the state's 
witnesses were in conflict as to whether a "bypass" ignition had 
been placed on the steering column of the truck (R. 167-68, 172, 
185-86), the state's witness who testified that he saw the 
ignition also stated that the device may be used if the original 
ignition is not working properly, which comports with the fact 
that the truck was in disrepair. (R. 172.) 
If the conclusion of the jurors is based on their 
weighing conflicting evidence or evidence susceptible 
of differing interpretations, there is a greater 
likelihood that they will be improperly influenced 
through remarks of counsel. Indeed, in such cases, the 
jurors may be searching for guidance in weighing and 
interpreting the evidence. They may be especially 
susceptible to influence, and a small degree of 
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influence may be sufficient to affect the verdict. 
Counsel is obligated in such cases to avoid, as far as 
possible, any reference to those matters the jury is 
not justified in considering. 
State v. Trov, 688 P.2d 483, 486-87 (Utah 1984). 
Since (1) the argument directed the jurors' attention to 
matters outside the evidence of the case, i.e., that if they were 
the victims of such a crime, they would not want the finder of 
fact to "let [Carlson] go," and (2) the error was substantial and 
prejudicial such that in its absence there was a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result for Carlson, the 
impropriety of the remarks merits vacation of the judgment. 
State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475, 478 (Utah 1989). 
REASONS WHY ORAL ARGUMENT SHOULD BE GRANTED AND OPINION 
ISSUED. 
Oral argument and a published opinion vacating the judgment 
and remanding this case to the trial court for a new trial would 
clarify the use by the trial court of jury instructions that 
create presumptions going to the crucial element of intent, 
specifically where the instruction is not established by the Utah 
code or other penal statute. In addition, a published opinion 
would remind trial courts that such instructions are prejudicial 
and compromise a defendant's due process rights. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Carlson respectfully requests that 
this Court vacate the conviction and judgment entered in the 
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trial court, and remand the case to the trial court for a new 
trial. 
SUBMITTED this 2FU day of July, 1996. 
~K{ Qfuf^ 
JINDA M. JONES 
Attorney for DeffsJndant/Appellant 
REBECCA HYDE 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, LINDA M. JONES, hereby certify that I have caused to be 
hand-delivered eight copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84102, and four copies to the Utah Attorney General's Office, 
Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor, P.O. 
Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this ASi£ day of 
July, 1996. 
UM^KJH^ 
INDA M. JONES 
DELIVERED this day of July, 1996. 
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ADDENDUM A 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
T)u;flyhft Marvin Cbrlson 
/ 
Oefendant. 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
(COMMITMENT) 
Case No. 
Count No. 
Honorable 
Clerk ffipck 
Q<r/9n/s"7/ 
W±- dkmt* 
R e p o r t e r ^ 1r ft cL ^QU^ifA 
Bailiff - f f i / / SLakbe^ l 
Date Jkjf/tb 
D The motion of to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by£(a jury; D the court; D plea of guilty; 
D plea of no contest; of the offense of P e c &i V*L tfrr ~firah*>, £ - f
 nI P ^  Pr-o ppjriy , a felony 
of then7r>^l. degree, D a class misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented by ft, Hydfi* , and the State being represented by K. Bet/mtJs-^^fl&hw adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
years and which may be for life; D to a maximum mandatory term of 
D not to exceed five years; 
^ o f not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; £ S^h/t^/ %A. ) 
D of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed years; 
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of 
D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ to 
D such sentence is to run concurrently with 
D such sentence is to run consecutively with 
D upon motion of D State, Q Defense, • Court, Count(s) 
D 
are hereby dismissed. 
^Defendant is granted a stay of the above (O prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of 3 v? tyon+hjz , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
^C Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County • for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, orljkfor delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
Commitment shall issue 
DATED this 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Defense Counsel S 
Deputy County Attorney Page . / of o£ 
# ct5tft>iS''7l 
Judgment/State v. VUSayn^ MQrVtik LdtdSeiLJCR /Honorable faJ- B » Sir! 4* 
CONDITIONS OF PROBATION 
&UJsual and ordinary conditions required by the Dept. of Adult Probation & Parole.
 I 
D Serve L& mOI\+h*> 6fr> b*~*reJe**rA Only 4o Pep-h, h+ Lorir, proj, ih O^A^h\ 
in the Salt Lake County Jail commencing ^ P i r M ) ^ / ^ _ ^ 
D Pay a fine in the amount of $ D at a rate to be determined by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole; or • at the rate of . 
D Pay restitution in the amount of $ ; or • in an amount to be determined by the Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole; D at a rate of ; or D at a rate to be determined by 
the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
D Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or treatment as 
directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole, 
D Enter, participate in, and complete th 
D Participate in and complete any D educational; and/or D vocational training • as directed by the 
Department of Adult Probation and Parole; or D with 
• Participate in and complete any training D as directed by the Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole; or D with 
D Submit person, residence, and vehicle to search and seizure for the detection of drugs. 
D Submit to drug testing. 
D Not associate with anyone who illegally uses, sells, or otherwise distrubutes narcotics or drugs. 
D Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise distributed illegally. 
D Not use or possess non-prescribed controlled substances. 
D Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
D Submit to testing for alcohol use. 
D Take antabuse • as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
D Obtain and maintain full-time employment. 
D Maintain full-time employment. 
D Obtain and maintain full-time employment or full-time schooling. 
D Maintain full-time employment or obtain and maintain full-time schooling. 
D Defendant is to have no contact nor associate with 
D Defendant's probation may be transferred to under the Interstate Compact as approved 
by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
D Complete hours of community service restitution as directed by the Department of Adult Probation 
and Parole. 
• Complete hours of community service restitution in lieu of days in jail. 
• Defendant is to commit no crimes. 
D Defendant is ordered to appear before this Court on for a review of this sentence. 
X V*fr -h? flgvflflp reading \ liJrH-Uft **rSf?Uint) Skills ausrin* H-im* in. 
yi X) f f i ' "H7 Sib* a4rpptoen+ -for TM\1 ^i«\QHhi~ p f Chid supp* Qtrtn^s* 
D I rttruUltfl 4-*4»* +,*«e tf-f children* )?)***) <H- p*/ cA.lfi d«/ip- pmi~s , 
D cj~ m f i H - ?£L°r+!> >*> PjTfrUi/rsA rpJf(^pnsA;> ru?lih c hilarm 
-«•
 x
 "aft.. 
DATED this / M d a y of H ? i 
Page CTS of &***+ 
ADDENDUM B 
41-la-1316. Receiving or transferring stolen motor vehi-
cle, trailer, or semitrailer — Penalty. 
It is a second degree felony for a person: 
(1) with intent to procure or pass title to a motor vehicle, trailer, or 
semitrailer that he knows or has reason to believe has been stolen or 
unlawfully taken to receive or transfer possession of the motor vehicle, 
trailer, or semitrailer from or to another; or 
(2) to have in his possession any motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer 
that he knows or has reason to believe has been stolen or unlawfully 
taken if he is not a peace officer engaged at the time in the performance of 
his duty. 
76-1-503. Presumption of fact. 
An evidentiary presumption established by this code or other penal statute 
has the following consequences: 
(1) When evidence of facts which support the presumption exist, the 
issue of the existence of the presumed fact must be submitted to the jury 
unless the court is satisfied that the evidence as a whole clearly negates 
the presumed fact; 
(2) In submitting the issue of the existence of a presumed fact to the 
jury, the court shall charge that while the presumed fact must on all 
evidence be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the law regards the facts 
giving rise to the presumption as evidence of the presumed fact. 
76-6-402. Presumptions and defenses. 
The following presumption shall be applicable to this part: 
(1) Possession of property recently stolen, when no satisfactory expla-
nation of such possession is made, shall be deemed prima facie evidence 
that the person in possession stole the property. 
(2) It is no defense under this part that the actor has an interest in the 
property or service stolen if another person also has an interest that the 
actor is not entitled to infringe, provided an interest in property for 
purposes of this subsection shall not include a security interest for the 
repayment of a debt or obligation. 
(3) It is a defense under this part that the actor: 
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right to the property or service 
involved; or 
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he had the right to obtain or 
exercise control over the property or service as he did; or 
(c) Obtained or exercised control over the property or service 
honestly believing that the owner, if present, would have consented. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF 
RIGHTS 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in 
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
protection.] the Confederacy and claims not 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce ap- to be paid.] 
pointment.] 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the 
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation in-
curred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
ADDENDUM C 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
As jurors, it is your exclusive responsibility to 
determine the issues of fact in this case and you are to decide 
those issues from the evidence received in the trial and not from 
speculation or conjecture. 
The evidence to be considered by you includes the 
testimony of witnesses, exhibits received by the court, 
stipulations of the parties, reasonable inferences to be drawn from 
facts proven in the case, presumptions, if any, as are stated in 
these instructions, and all of the facts and circumstances 
disclosed thereby. Statements of counsel are not evidence and 
should not be considered as such by you. 
If and where there is a conflict in the evidence, you 
should reconcile such conflict as far as you reasonably can; but 
where the conflict cannot be reconciled then, since you are the 
final judges of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses, you 
must resolve that conflict and determine from the evidence what you 
believe the true facts to be. 
0 0 0 0 & fc 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The State of Utah and the defendants both are entitled to 
the individual opinion of each juror. It is the duty of each of 
you after considering all the evidence in the case, to determine, 
if possible, the question of guilt or innocence of the defendant. 
When you have reached a conclusion in that respect, you should not 
change it merely because one or more or all of your fellow jurors 
may have come to a different conclusion. However, each juror 
should freely and fairly discuss with his fellow jurors the 
evidence and the deduction to be drawn therefrom. If after doing 
so, any juror should be satisfied that a conclusion first reached 
by him was wrong, he unhesitatingly should abandon that original 
opinion and render his verdict according to his final decision. 
n r\ a <\ * -
INSTRUCTION NO, 
If, after a careful, honest, and impartial consideration 
of these instruction and all of the evidence admitted in the case, 
any of your number should honestly and conscientiously differ ont 
he weight and affect to be given to the evidence and the verdict to 
be rendered, than I instinct you that you may disagree, and you are 
not called upon to surrender your honest convictions concerning the 
effect of the evidence in this case, or as to the verdict to be 
rendered, for the mere purpose of agreeing upon a verdict. 
0 0 010 0 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
To constitute the crime charged in the information there 
must be the joint operation of two essential elements: conduct 
prohibited by law and the appropriate culpable mental state or 
states with regard to the conduct prohibited by law. 
Before a defendant may be found guilty of a crime, the 
evidence must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
was prohibited from committing the conduct charged in the 
information and that the defendant committed such conduct with 
the culpable mental state required for such offense. 
"Conduct" means an act or omission. 
"Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech. 
"Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty 
to act and the actor is capable of acting. 
a (t\ ! ^ ^ 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that in every crime or public offense, 
there must be a union or joint operation of the act and intent. 
A person is only guilty of an offense when his conduct is 
prohibited by law and he acts with some kind of criminal intent 
that is, he acts intentionally or knowingly as the definition of an 
offense requires. 
As used in these instruction, a person engages in conduct 
"intentionally" or with intent, when it is his conscious objective 
or desire to engage in conduct or cause the result. 
As used in these instructions, a person engages in 
conduct "knowingly" or with knowledge, when he is aware that his 
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
o o o i o ? 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The intent with which an act is done denotes a state of 
mind and connotes a purpose in so acting. Intent being a state of 
mind is seldom susceptible of proof by direct and positive evidence 
and must ordinarily be inferred from acts, conduct, statements and 
circumstances. Thus, you would be justified in inferring that a 
person must have intended the natural and probable consequences of 
any act purposely done by him. 
0 O O J & 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Two classes of evidence are recognized and admitted in 
courts of justice, upon either or both of which, juries lawfully 
may base their findings, whether favorable to the State or to the 
defendant, provided, however, that to support a verdict of guilt 
the evidence, whether of one kind or the other or a combination of 
both, must carry the convincing quality required by law. 
One type of evidence is known as direct and the other as 
circumstantial. The law makes no distinction between the two 
classes as to the degree of proof required for conviction or as to 
their effectiveness in defendant's favor, but respects each for 
such convincing force as it may carry and accepts each as a 
reasonable method of proof. 
Direct evidence of a person's conduct at any time in 
question consists of the testimony of every witness who, with any 
of his own physical senses, perceived such conduct or any part 
thereof, and which testimony describes or relates what thus was 
perceived. All other evidence admitted in the trial is 
circumstantial in relation to such conduct, and, insofar as it 
shows any act, statement or other conduct, or any circumstance of 
fact, tending to prove by reasonable inference the innocence or 
guilt of the defendant, it may be considered by you in arriving at 
a verdict. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
A person charged with a crime is presumed to be innocent until 
he is proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The presumption of 
innocence is not a mere form to be disregarded by the jury at 
pleasure but is a substantial, essential part of the law and is 
binding upon the jury. This presumption is a humane provision of 
the law, intended, so far as human agency is capable, to guard 
against the danger of an innocent person being unjustly punished. 
The presumption of innocence must continue to prevail in the 
minds of the jury unless and until the jury is satisfied beyond a 
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant, and, in case of a 
reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, he is entitled to an 
acquittal. 
0 0 0 I 0 5 
INSTRUCTION NO-
You are instructed that the mere fact that the defendant 
has been charged with this offense and has been held to answer to 
the charge by a committing magistrate, is not any evidence of his 
guilt and is not even a circumstance which should be considered by 
you in determining his guilt or innocence. 
•fl ft a 1 , 1 , . 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that the information the defendant has 
entered a plea of not guilty. The plea of not guilty denies each 
and all of the essential allegations of the charge contained in the 
information and casts upon the State the burden of proving each and 
all of the essential allegations thereof to your satisfaction and 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
(IfllH^ 
INSTRUCTION NO 
You are instructed that the defendant is a competent 
witness in his own behalf and his testimony should be received and 
given the same consideration as you give to that of any other 
witness. The fact that he stands accused of a crime is no evidence 
of his guilt and is no reason for rejecting his testimony. 
However, you should weigh his testimony the same as you weigh the 
testimony of any other witness. 
A r\ A i n s: 
INSTRUCTION NO. v \ V 
The fact that the defendant has been convicted o£ a ui'line 
may be considered by you for only one purpose, namely, in judging 
the credibility of such testimony. The fact of such rsr^Onvicgtqn 
does not necessarily destroy or impair the defendant's credibility, 
and it does not raise a presumption that the defendant or witness 
has testified falsely. It is simply one of the circumstances that 
you are to take into consideration in weighing the testimony of 
such a witness. too Oorv \ {\s T\ o cVcA XAcA J^ 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Possession of property recently stolen, if not 
satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance from which 
you may reasonably draw the inference and find, in light of the 
surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence in the case, that 
the person in possession of the stolen property stole the 
property and knew that the property was stolen. 
Thus, if you find from the evidence and beyond a reasonable 
doubt (1) that the defendant was in possession of property, (2) 
that the property was stolen, (3) that such possession was not 
too remote in point of time from the theft, and (4) that no 
satisfactory explanation of such possession has been given or 
appears from the evidence, then you may infer from those facts 
and find that the defendant stole the property and knew the 
property was stolen. 
0 0 0 i i o 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
It is a defense that the defendant acted in the honest 
belief that he had the right to obtain or exercise control over 
the property or service as he did. 
0 0 0 1 i i 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Before you can convict the defendant, Dwayne Carlson, of the 
offense of Receiving a Stolen Motor Vehicle as charged in Count I 
of the Information, you must find from all of the evidence and 
beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following 
elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about the 22nd day of July, 1995, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, Dwayne Carlson, had in 
his possession a motor vehicle; and 
2• That the defendant knew that said property had been 
stolen or had reason to believe that said property had been 
stolen; and 
3. That the defendant had in his possession said property 
with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in 
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one 
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant guilty of Receiving a Stolen Motor 
Vehicle as charged in Count I of the Information. If, on the 
other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of 
any one or more of the foregoing elements, then you must find the 
defendant not guilty of Count I. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
"Property" means anything of value, including tangible 
personal property. 
"Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious object to 
withhold property permanently or for so extended a period or to 
use under circumstances that a substantial portion of its 
economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, would be lost, 
or to restore the property only upon payment of a reward or other 
compensation, or to dispose of the property under circumstances 
that make it unlikely that the owner will recover it. 
"Receives" means acquiring possession, control, or title or 
lending on the security of the property. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
If in these instructions any rule , direction or idea has been stated in varying ways, no 
emphasis thereon is intended, and none must be inferred by you. For that reason, you are 
not to single out any certain sentence, or any individual point or instruction, but you are to 
consider the instructions as a whole, and to regard each in the light of all the others. 
The order in which the instructions are given has no significance as to their relative 
importance. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
In arriving at a verdict in this case, you shall not discuss 
nor consider the subject of penalty or punishment, as that is a 
matter which lies with the Court and other governmental agencies, 
and must not in any way affect your decision as to the guilt or 
innocence of a defendant. 
fl/iflH ~ 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The attitude and conduct of jurors at the outset of their deliberations are a matter of 
considerable importance. It is rarely productive of good for a juror, upon entering the jury 
room, to make an emphatic expression of their opinion on the case or to announce a 
determination to stand for a certain verdict. When one does that at the outset, their sense of 
pride may be aroused, and they may hesitate to recede from an announced position even if 
shown that it is fallacious. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates in this matter, 
but are judges. The final test of the quality of your service will lie in the verdict which you 
return to the court not in the opinions any of you may hold as you retire to begin your 
deliberations. Have in mind that you will make a definite contribution to efficient judicial 
administration if you arrive at a just and proper verdict. To that end, the court would 
remind you that in your deliberations in the jury room there can be no triumph excepting the 
ascertainment and declaration of the truth and the administration of justice based thereon. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
The court has endeavored to give you instructions 
embodying all rules of law that may become necessary in guiding you 
to a just and lawful verdict. The applicability of some of these 
instructions will depend upon the conclusions you reach as to what 
the facts are. As to any such instruction, the fact that it has 
been given must not be taken as indicating an opinion of the court 
and that the instruction will be necessary or as to what the facts 
are. If an instruction applies only to a state of facts which you 
find does not exist, you will disregard the instruction. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
When you retire to consider your verdict, you will select one 
of your members to act as foreperson, who, as foreperson, will 
preside over your deliberation. 
Your verdict in this case must be either; 
Guilty of Receiving a Stolen Vehicle, 
OR 
Not guilty; 
as your deliberations may determine. 
This being a criminal case, a unanimous concurrence of all 
jurors is required to find a verdict. Your verdict must be in 
writing, and when found, must be signed and dated by your 
foreperson and then returned by you to this court. When your 
verdict has been found, notify the bailiff that you are ready to 
report to the Court. 
DATE at Salt Lake City, Utah this / / day of (^y^r^U^^ 
1995. 
PAT B . BRIAN, 
G O O i l ^ 
